By Matjaz Potrc, Vojko Strahovnik, Mark Noriss Lance
Particularism is a justly well known ‘cutting-edge’ subject in modern ethics internationally. Many ethical philosophers don't, actually, aid particularism (instead protecting ''generalist'' theories that leisure on specific summary ethical principles), yet approximately all may take it to be a place that keeps to supply critical classes and demanding situations that can't be competently missed. Given the excessive regular of the contributions, and that this can be a topic the place energetic debate keeps to flourish, Challenging ethical Particularism turns into required studying for execs and complex scholars operating within the area.
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Extra resources for Challenging Moral Particularism
On this view, one can acquire (or at least possess) the concept of duty only on the basis of acquiring (or at least possessing) the concept of, say, a duty to do a good deed for someone who has gone to great trouble to help one paint a garage. It is from one’s understanding of such a concrete duty that one acquires a concept of duty as such. This is not the view that knowledge of particular truths about a case of duty yields knowledge of something general about duty; that epistemological point, which an epistemological particularist like Ross is likely to accept, could hold where the former kind of knowledge embodies a general concept of duty.
Contrast act-consequentialism as a decision procedure with particularism as a decision procedure. Act-consequentialism as a decision procedure would tell agents to focus on the good at stake and to be impartial in calculating that good. Presumably, particularism is more pluralistic than actconsequentialism. Particularism might well tell agents to focus on more different kinds of considerations. And particularism might well fail to insist on impartiality in assessing the good. Beyond that, we know that particularism tells agents to make the best decision in the circumstances.
I concede that this concept may not be as thickly descriptive as some other moral concepts. Relatedly, what counts as just may be more contestable than what counts as honest or kind. Still, justice does always have positive moral polarity, and is clearly thicker than concepts such as morally right, morally wrong, etc. In any case, I don’t think we need to rely on justice as our sole counter-example to Dancy’s particularism. As I’ve argued elsewhere and above, there are other counter-examples. 26 Brad Hooker Dancy’s third response aims not at any particular counter-examples but rather at the whole idea that his particularism is vulnerable to counterexample.