By William Sweet (auth.), William Sweet (eds.)
Today, whilst systematic philosophy - and cause itself - are challenged either outdoors of and inside philosophy, is it nonetheless attainable to do metaphysics? This quantity presents a vast point of view on modern ways to the character and the basic questions of metaphysics. Drawing on students from continental Europe, Asia, Canada, the USA, and nice Britain, and representing numerous philosophical cultures and traditions, this quantity surveys and extends paintings in metaphysics and its implications for broader philosophical issues (e.g., in ethics and social philosophy, in arithmetic and common sense, and in epistemology). It additionally addresses such questions because the function of background and historicity in venture metaphysics, the character of metaphysics, the concern of metaphysics over epistemology, and the demanding situations of empiricism and postmodernism.
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Additional info for Approaches to Metaphysics
Perhaps the mystery is a little too plain,” said Dupin. “Oh, good heavens! ” “Ha! ha! ha! – ha! ha! ha! – ho! ho! ”72 NOTES 1 Abbreviations used: “SCG” is Summa contra gentiles; “ST’ is Summa theologiae: I will sometimes cite the pagination of the edition published at Ottawa: Collège Dominicain, 1941; “CM” is In XII libros METAPHYSICORUM Aristotelis Commentarium; “CP” is In libros PHYSICORUM Aristotelis expositio; “DP” is De potentia; “DV” is De veritate. DOES BEING HAVE A NATURE? 1 (533), on Aristotle at 1003a26–32.
One might be tempted to say that “ens” is empty, but what Aureol is saying is that it has as many meanings as there are categories. It has no one meaning. 40 What sort of argument is used to show this quasi-equivocity of “ens”? The first argument of Aureol is based on the problem of “addition” to the concept of “a being,” and is quite representative of his style. He says: That concept which enters into complete identity [incidit in identitatem omnimodam], nothing at all being added, with every ratio, does not say any one ratio.
We should notice that Capreolus has indicated the possibility of restricting the scope of “a being” merely to the ten categories. 3. P. Scotus’s 6th argument: … everything which has a “what” [quid] is univocal, because predication as to what [praedicari in quid] expresses the quidditative ratio; but “a being” has a “what,” as is clear from the first two premises. [132B] Capreolus says: ... “a being” [ens] does not say “what” concerning any creature, because of no creature is its essence or quiddity being [esse].