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By Gary Jason Hartenburg

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Extra resources for 'A Somewhat Lengthy and Difficult Argument'' The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Plato's ''Republic'' 476e-480a

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PA4} If X is a “many,” then X is a sense-perceptible object. In the second one, the assumptions of the lovers of sights and sounds are {LSSA1}–{LSSA3}: {LSSA1} If X is ‘that which is’, then X is a sense-perceptible object. {LSSA2} If X is ‘that which not is’, then X is nothing. {LSSA3} If X is a “many,” then X is a sense-perceptible object. It is significant that there is no assumption on the part of the lovers of sights and sounds about the nature of things that are both ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’.

But as Adam himself notes, Plato could be aiming the Argument at both. For a helpful survey of some of Antisthenes’s positions relevant to the Argument, see Denyer, Language, Thought, and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 27–33. 88. See Adam, The Republic of Plato, 1:338, for the details of Antisthenes’ view and our record of it. Stokes (“Plato and the Sightlovers of the Republic,” 290n10) suggests that Protagoras has been considered as a target, which is consistent with Palmer’s claim that the sophists in general can be classified among the lovers of sights and sounds (Plato’s Reception of Parmenides, 56–87).

Belief is not over ‘that which not is’. [27, 28] Ignorance is over ‘that which not is’. [8] Ignorance is a faculty. [implicit] Belief and ignorance are different faculties. [13, 14, 15, 17, 29, 30, 31] Belief is neither ignorance nor knowledge. [23, 32] Belief is not outside ignorance or knowledge. Belief appears darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance. If (i) belief is neither ignorance nor knowledge and (ii) belief is not outside ignorance or knowledge and (iii) belief appears darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance, then belief lies between knowledge and ignorance.

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